In discussing the question of God's nature, contemporary theologians usually pay very little attention to the history of the doctrine of God, especially in its pre-Augustinian phase. In his Systematic Theology, for example, Tillich develops a rational understanding of God and only mentions Tertullian once in a footnote.
Further on in the treatise, Tertullian argues that immutability is a property of eternity, and therefore of God, since mutability and temporality belong observably to matter. He says that "what is eternal does not change; obviously it would lose what it had been by becoming by the change what it was not, if it were not eternal." 9 This passage implies that the type of mutability which renders matter temporal is not simply change of any sort, but loss. Tertullian may have used the term indemutabilis of God in a precise sense to indicate that a particular type of immutability, that is, incapacity to become less, belongs to the eternal.
10
Eternity cannot belong to anything which changes for the worse.
But then change (demutatione [= change for the worse]) has been admitted by matter, and if this is so, it has lost its condition (status) of eternity; it has, in short, died its natural death (mortua est denique sua forma). But eternity cannot be lost because, unless it cannot be lost, it is not eternity.
11
Tertullian concludes by saying: "Therefore it is incapable of change for the worse (demutatione), because if it is eternity it can be changed for the worse (demutari) in no way."
Tertulliano use of the term demutatio, indicating a change which involves loss, and the context of the argument itself, show that eternity cannot involve loss. Eternity and the incapacity to become less go together. Matter decays and is therefore not eternal, and because of his earlier argument (not eternal = not divine) it is not divine.
12
Another passage in Tertullian carries the same implication. The type of change which involves loss is impossible for God. God exists in "unimpaired integrity and ought not to be diminished (minui) or suspended (intercipi) or destroyed (corrumpi). Well, then, also His happiness (felicitas) would disappear if He ever suffered loss (si quidpatitur)"
13
If God as eternal cannot become less, neither can He become more. He is by definition the supreme, that magnum summum, existing in eternity.
14 Against Marcion's second God of goodness, for whom he claims superiority to the Creator of the Old Testament, Tertullian must once again argue the oneness of God and that the divine attributes cannot be shared. "God is not if He is not one." 15 The definition of God then follows: "God is the great supreme (summum magnum) existing in eternity, unborn (innatum), unmade (infectum), without beginning and without 9 12, 3 (Waszink 42). 10 See 2, 2; 12, 1; 12, 3; Braun 57. 11 12, 4. 12 Section 34 is a good summary. 13 Ad nat. 2, 6. 14 Adv. Marc. 1, 3, 2; God as magnum summum is an original description; cf. Braun 43. 15 Adv. Marc. 1, 3. end (sine initio, sine fine)" 16 In this last passage we see again the importance which the attribute of eternity has for Tertullian. To introduce a second God, Marcion must ascribe to Him the property of eternity. But eternity can only belong to the supreme being, who, because He is the supreme being, is unique. And the unique is by definition one.
Since God is not temporal, neither is He mutable. Tertullian says: "Eternity has no time. It is itself all time: it acts; it cannot then suffer (Quod facit, pati non potest)" 17 The type of immutability which eternity implies in this passage is the incapacity to be affected by time, which is the third type of immutability that is ascribed to God. He is incapable of becoming less, because only matter can decay. He cannot become more, because He is already summum magnum. Neither can He be affected by that which is temporal.
Divine Mutability
It seems by this time that all possible mutability in God has been ruled out by Tertullian. However, one attribute which he and other Christian theologians had to defend against Marcion was the goodness of the Creator. 18 It is his delineation of this aspect of God's character in relation to the world which leads directly to one of his main arguments for God's mutability.
The Adversus Marcionem contains Tertulliano most important discussion of goodness as a divine attribute.
19 This is the main attribute of Marcion's God and this distinguishes him from the God of the Old Testament. Tertullian attempts to discover, he says, "certain rules for examining God's goodness." This is the first: "All things in God should be natural and ingenerate (ingenita), in order that they may be eternal just like God's own state." If they naturally belong to God, the attributes will not be "accounted casual and extraneous, and thereby temporal and lacking eternity." Since God is eternal, so ought His attributes to be. But Marcion's God is not eternally good. He becomes so by saving mankind. Therefore.... The second rule is that "all properties of God ought to be as rational as they are natural." Therefore God's goodness must be reasonable to be good. For it is, furthermore, at this point quite open to discussion whether God ought to be regarded as a being of simple goodness, to the exclusion of all those other attributes (appendicibus), sensations (sensibus), and affections (adfectibus) which the Marcionites indeed transfer from their god to the Creator, and which we acknowledge to be worthy characteristics of the Creator too.
24
The sense of this passage is even stronger than the translation suggests: if any being is represented as divine without the attributes which express personal responsiveness to the world, it lacks a necessary aspect of deity and is therefore not divine.
Tertullian also argues that Marcion contradicts himself, because Marcion's god too truly feels. Marcion held that the good God, announced by Jesus, was a newcomer in the affairs of mankind and therefore began to have a concern for salvation which he did not have previously. had an adversary and His justice acquired another function, which was to direct His goodness against this adversary. The result: "The divine goodness, being interrupted in that free course whereby God was spontaneously good, is now dispensed according to the deserts of every man; it is offered to the worthy, denied to the unworthy, taken from the unthankful, and also avenged on all its enemies." 33 God is "good from His own (character), just in consequence of ours. For if man had never sinned, he would simply and solely have known God in His superlative goodness, from the attribute of His nature." 34 Justice is an extension of the divine goodness when it is a punishment for sin.
We have seen two instances of divine mutability in Tertullian, and they are related. Although God is eternally good and just, He becomes a judge vis à vis human sinfulness; and He begins to feel the emotions of a judge, such as offense and anger. Essentially, however, because He is eternal, He cannot become less or more, or in any basic sense be affected by time.
Although his thinking is neither acute nor systematic enough to formulate this understanding satisfactorily, Tertullian has insight into the religious and theological significance of God's mutability. In his polemical works he seems to become so involved in arguing against his opponents' theories that he does not recall immutability-mutability distinctions previously made. On the whole, he does not carefully distinguish between different types of immutability and mutability which God has. He never constructs a completely systematic understanding of God, although careful distinctions regarding mutability are clearly made, as we shall see.
Book 2, chapter 16 of the work against Marcion contains Tertulliano most fruitful discussion of divine mutability. He begins by justifying God's severity and the emotions which flow from severity: wrath, jealousy, and sternness. These are as indispensable to severity as severity is to justice. In De testimonio animae Tertullian argues the same point in another way. Marcionites "honor" God by absolving Him from His concern for knowing the world, and do not ascribe anger to Him. If God is angry, they say, He is passionate (passionali^), and that which is passionate is corruptible. 35 But the soul has a superior opinion. be corrupted and must therefore die." They judge that the divine is like the human. They think that God must have the same passions as man, when actually the reverse is true. Tertullian tells the Marcionites: "Discriminate between the natures (substantias) and assign to them their respective senses, which are as diverse as their natures require, although they seem to have a community of designation." 37 God apparently has these feelings in the supreme way that befits His nature. One can only think analogously about God's emotions and ours, not univocally.
Tertullian continues: We are made in God's image, and this is the basis of our emotive similarity with Him: "And this, therefore, is to be deemed the likeness of God in man, that the human soul have the same emotions and sensations as God, although they are not of the same kind, differing as they do both in their conditions (status) and their expressions (exitus) according to their nature." 38 The major distinction drawn between God's emotions and our own is that ours are had in a corruptible manner and God's are not, since the divine essence is incorruptible. God has these emotions but in a divine manner, which is to say that He has all emotions perfectly. God possesses meekness, patience, mercy, and their parent, goodness. So also He has anger. God is affected by these particular emotions in a happy manner, however, because of His incorruptibility. He will be angry but not irritated or tempted, moved but not subverted. He must use all (His feelings) because of all (situations), as many senses as there are causes: anger because of the proud and whatever else hinders evil. So again, mercy because of the erring, and patience because of the impenitent, and preeminent resources because of the meritorious, and whatever is the work of good. All these feelings move Him in His own way, in which it is fitting that He should be moved (pati) y and because of Him man is affected equally in his own way. 40 We have seen that God cannot become less or more, or be affected by time. He is eternally the same. It is obviously the case, however, that He can and must feel negative emotions to be a judge, and further, all emotions in order to be God. He does not feel them as we do, but nevertheless does feel them somehow, and therefore changes in an appropriately divine manner. This manner is not specifically or systematically defined by Tertullian, but God's feelings are to be understood by analogy with our own, analogy which is rooted in the relationship of man ¿«, AU, **. to God as God's image. Tertulliano God is really related to the world and responsive to the peculiar situation of each person.
A major objection to divine mutability is met: the Marcionite claim that God is inconstant if He changes his past judgments. 41 Tertullian argues that the mark of a good judge is to decide on the merits of the case at hand, in terms of the present moment of a person's existence. God must change His judgment depending upon the goodness or evil of persons now. No one should think of Him as completely rejecting or choosing a person for life. The capability which God has to judge and decide rationally whether to accept or reject someone is an aspect of divine providence.
Tertullian makes the same argument to affirm the invalidity of Jewish religious institutions. "Let us not annul this power which God has to reform the law's precepts answerably to the circumstances of the times, with a view to man's salvation."
42 Jewish religious institutions are no longer a valid response to God's will, according to Tertullian, because His will has changed.
In Book 2, chapter 24 of the work against Marcion, Tertullian discusses the sartie type of divine mutability with regard to 1 Sam 15:11, where God "repents ... that I have set up Saul to be king." God's repentance in this case, as with the Ninevites, has a different meaning than it does for man. It is obvious from the Greek term for repentance that sin need not be involved:
For it will have no other meaning than a simple change of a prior purpose; and this is admissible without any blame even in a man, much more in God, whose every purpose is faultless. Now in Greek the word for repentance (metanoia) is formed not from the confession of a sin but from a change of mind, which in God we have shown to be regulated by the occurrence of varying circumstances.
Thus for Tertullian there are three types of divine mutability. God changes to become the judge of human sinfulness; He feels various emotions which are appropriate to judging, and also those appropriate to His goodness; and His will changes in accord with the changing circumstances of history. In each case the change is caused in God by changes in the temporal world.
Tertulliano desire to include mutability in his description of God springs partially, I believe, from what he conceives as logical necessity. But his major concern is to represent theologically the personal and active God of biblical faith in His relationships with the world. While Tertullian is not unique in having this concern, he expresses it more strongly than any other early Christian writer. 43 The theological implication of these passages is important. If they had been more influential, they might have paved the way for a systematic view of God which took the divine emotions more seriously than has usually been the case in the mainstream of theology.
Tertullian 9 s "Capitulation''
A number of authors have argued that Tertullian "capitulates" to Marcion in regard to divine mutability. This opinion is based upon a passage in the second book of the treatise against Marcion and is held by M. Pohlenz, 44 R. Cantalamessa, 45 and Jean-Claude Fredouille. 46 They appeal to this passage: "Whatever attributes, therefore, you (Marcionites) require as worthy of God must be found in the Father, who is invisible and unapproachable and placid and (so to speak) the God of the philosophers, whereas those qualities which you censure as unworthy must be supposed to be in the Son." 47 The authors I have cited sense quite correctly that Tertullian is attributing passibility to the Second Person here. We shall see in De carne Christi how the Incarnation represents a type of divine mutability, but he probably does not have that in mind. In this passage, however, he may vacillate but he does not capitulate.
Fredouille himself admits this in effect by citing passages which occur later in the treatise in which Tertullian states "encore la légitimité de la colère divine." 48 1 suspect that the authors see Tertulliano "capitulation" as a point in his favor, because they themselves see no alternative to absolute divine immutability and wish to see Tertullian as "coming around in the end."
Divine Mutability in the Incarnation
Tertullian wrote another treatise against the Marcionites specifically to take issue with their Docetism (De carne Christi). This was followed 43 Norris (God and World 112) is puzzled by the fact that Tertullian accepts the "Platonized doctrine of God and creation which he had inherited from his predecessors as normative Christian teaching," but that he is troubled by God's immutability. He suggests that Tertullian did not understand or come to terms with the "philosophical presuppositions of the theology he transmits." I believe it is just as likely that Tertullian did understand the Platonic presuppositions but was more critical (at least unconsciously) of them than his predecessors and was, in effect, attempting to be more biblical than they. because He is God. There is a sense in which the divine will does not obey the laws and dictates of logical possibility.
55
Tertulliano argument, then, is that the divine character is such that it can allow for change while retaining its identity. The change which did occur was the embodiment (corporationem) of the Word in Jesus. 56 On this basis certain Christological statements can be taken literally: God was literally crucified, God died and was buried, God rose from the dead. It is in this manner that Tertullian solves the problem of the communication of idioms.
The fact that the Docetic Marcionites deny this destroys the "indispensable dishonor of our faith." 57 The cardinal point of Christian faith in the Incarnation is that it is based upon the inept, dishonorable, and impossible fact of the death and resurrection of the Son of God. And for Tertullian this ineptitude is grounded in divine mutability. This is a unique explanation for the change in God which the Incarnation involves. Tertullian is the first Christian theologian to fully confront the problem of reason which Christian belief in the Incarnation represents. Because of the obvious logical difficulty of his position, however, it is not surprising that he is not consistent later on. In Adversus Praxean he not only changes his terminology but even defends what he denied previously: the unchanging nature of the Word.
58
Tertullian again asks how one can understand the statement that the "Word became flesh." 59 Is the becoming to be understood as a transfiguratio or as a clothing (indutus) with flesh? It must be a clothing that is meant. We must believe that God is unchangeable and incapable of form, since He is eternal. Transfiguration is the destruction of that which previously existed. "For whatsoever is transfigured into some other thing ceases to be that which it had been and begins to be that which it 55 See De carne 3, 1: "With God, however, nothing is impossible but what He does not will." Also in Adv. Praxean 10, 9: "For with God, to be willing is to be able. All that He has willed, however, He has both been able to accomplish and has displayed His ability." Tertulliano understanding of God's will as active in history is unique in early Christian theology. See Norris, God and World 118 f., for an excellent presentation of this theme in Tertullian. 56 4,1. Tertullian has returned here to the logic of the book against Hermogenes with which we began. Apparently he was unable to reconcile the mutability of the Son with the immutability of the divine essence. This is further evidence that his tools were simply inadequate for the formulation of a systematic conception of God which could adequately express both immutability and mutability; more importantly, he was unable to synthesize carefully, I believe, because of the polemic intentions of his major works.
Of all the authors consulted, J. P. Mahé has the best view of the inconsistency between the two treatises. He explains the inconsistency as a clarity of expression gained by the time
Admittedly, any type of incarnational mutability of God, when conceived in a realistic manner, is difficult to conceptualize even for modern theology. In any case, Tertullian has made some essential contributions to a theology of God which is able to take His personality seriously. God cannot change in the same manner in which we do, but change He must if He is to be involved in the world of change. He cannot feel as we do, but feel He must if He is to be involved in a world of persons, precisely as a person. God's goodness demands mutability if He is to be perfectly good. If He is a personal God, He must be able to respond to our needs.
Norris sees Tertullian as a theologian committed to the Middle Platonist tradition which he inherited from his predecessors, especially Justin and Irenaeus. 64 and so never openly presented the conflict. This fact, along with his polemical intentions, prevented him from developing a more systematic view of God.
FROM NOVATIAN TO LACTANTIUS
Three major Latin writers discuss divine immutability after Tertullian and before Augustine: Novatian, a Roman theologian, and two Africans, Arnobius of Sicca and his pupil Lactantius. Each in his own way responds to the immutability tradition as well as to the concern to preserve the divine emotions, mainly the divine wrath.
Novatian's major dogmatic treatise is his work De trinitate. It "was probably written well before 250 and is the first great Latin contribution to theology to appear in Rome." 65 A portion of this work (chaps. 4-7) discusses divine immutability and God's wrath. Somewhat later Arnobius wrote an apology for Christianity (Adversus nationes) in which the doctrine of God's immutability is the main theological idea. Lactantius apparently disagreed strongly enough with his teacher Arnobius about immutability to write a treatise about the reality of God's wrath (De ira Dei).
Novatian's work on the Trinity discusses the nature and attributes of God at some length. 66 He begins by stating that the Christian doctrines of God's fatherhood, His omnipotence, and creation are required by the rule of faith (regula fidei).
67 God has no beginning and no end. For this reason He is always infinite (semper immensus) and there is nothing greater. He is always eternal, because there is nothing older. That which is without origin is preceded by none, because it is not temporal.
68
God does not change or transform Himself into other forms, lest by change He should appear to be mortal. We see here the argument against divine mutability which Tertullian answered by distinguishing the qualities of mutability and mortality. For Tertullian change does not necessarily imply mortality; for Novatian it does. "For the change (immutatio) implied in turning from one thing to another (conversionis) is comprehended as a portion (portio) of a certain death." honor, lest anything should appear to have ever been wanting to His perfection." If anything increases in God, it implies that God had a beginning. If He loses anything, it indicates possible death and perishing. But that which constitutes His divinity must necessarily always exist and have no beginning and no end. God must always be the same to be God, and He is the same because He has no beginning. Novatian gives Tertulliano argument from Hermogenes 4, 3, which deduces God's oneness from His eternity:
And thus [because of no beginning] He is declared to be one (unus), having no equal. For whatever can be God must as God be of necessity the highest (summum). But whatever is the highest must certainly be the highest in such a sense as to be without any equal. And thus that must needs be alone (solum) and one on which nothing can be conferred, having no peer.
70
Further on, the argument surprisingly concludes that God is infinite rather than immutable or perfect. Novatian apparently takes infinity to be virtually the same as immutability or perfection, since the attributes all imply no beginning or end: "there cannot be two infinites, as the very nature of things dictates. And that is infinite which neither has any sort of beginning nor end." Novatian is much less clear on this point than Tertullian. He has confused the perfection, immutability, and infinity of God, because all involve lack of beginning and end to him.
Despite his defense of divine immutability, Novatian also defends the divine wrath, indignation, and even hatred in a manner reminiscent of, if not dependent upon, Tertullian. 71 We are not to understand these emotions "in the sense in which they are human vices," since God is incorruptible. "For such passions as these will rightly be said to be in men and will not rightly be judged to be in God." God has these passions but is not corrupted by them. Therefore He does not have them properly (non merito).
It is the passible nature of man as opposed to the impassible nature of God which allows us to distinguish between the wrath of the one and of the other. These passions are rightly felt by an embodied individual. Since God is not embodied, He does not have them properly. The following chapter argues against anthropomorphic conceptions of the deity despite the biblical passages to the contrary.
It is clear that in the treatise Novatian wants to argue for divine immutability as well as divine wrath. He is unable to reconcile these two doctrines because he does not have Tertullian's sense of the analogical character of language about God and ultimately must rest his case upon God's incomprehensibility. 
ARNOBIUS
Arnobius departs completely from the theological attempts to justify God's emotions. His major concern is to differentiate the Christian God from the popular deities of his time, and he apparently constructed his doctrine of God along Epicurean lines. 73 This makes him especially interesting for our purpose, since he is the only early Christian writer to think of God in this way. The Epicurean idea of God as aloof from the concerns of the world "runs through all of Adver sus nationes, and is really its central thought, the fountainhead of all its teaching."
74
The Adversus nationes militates strongly against the passionate gods and goddesses of paganism. They are much too involved in the affairs of the world to be divine. The actions and passions which the myths attribute to them are unworthy of God. When the enemies of Christianity, for instance, say that their gods are angry at Christians, do they not see that they are attributing base feelings to them? "For to be angry, what else is it than to be insane, to rave, to be urged to the lust of vengeance .. .?" 75 Thus they attribute feelings to the divine nature, and this cannot be the case.
True gods can have no anger or hold grudges. It is a sacrilege to believe that God feels despised if worship is not given. It is "childish, weak, petty, and unbecoming" for pagan gods to "be busied with the coarser matter of earth." 76 The Christian God does not need our prayers. Praying only benefits us by bringing us closer to God.
77
Arnobius often sees the same connection between feelings and corruptibility that we have previously noticed. The gods should not feel, since those who are "touched by passion live a life of suffering and are weakened by grief." They are therefore "bound by the laws of mortality. of suffering," 79 he says in reference to the soul. And "whatever is upheld by causes and things external to itself must be mortal and on the way to destruction, when anything on which it lives begins to be wanting."
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For a summary statement, let us return to the beginning of the work:
For wherever, as the philosophers hold, there is agitation, there of necessity passion must exist. Where passion is situated, it is reasonable that mental excitement (perturbatio) follows. Where there is mental excitement, there grief and sorrow exist. Where grief and sorrow exist, there is already room for weakening (imminutione) and decay (corruptioni).
81
The argument is repeated in almost the same form near the end of the work: feeling is being moved by another. Whatever is moved by another is capable of suffering and frailty and must therefore be corruptible. Anger is a feeling and thus it renders the angered being corruptible. "Therefore that should be called mortal which has been made subject to the emotions of anger." 82 But God is immortal; therefore God cannot be angry. taken away by revelation. 88 The first step in attaining true knowledge of God is to reject the popular religion; the second is "to perceive with the mind that there is but one supreme God, whose power and providence made the world from the beginning and afterwards continues to govern it."
LACTANTIUS Lactantius thinks of God in the familiar
89 The third and final step is the acceptance of Jesus' teaching, which moves us to knowledge and worship of the true God.
Because he has discussed the first step in another book, 90 Lactantius begins with the second. There are those who do accept the oneness of God but incorrectly understand His nature. They "deny that God has any figure ( figuram) or think that He is moved by no affection, because every affection is a sign of weakness (imbecillitatis), which has no existence in God." Others take anger away from God but believe Him to be kind. Lactantius lists all the possible solutions to the problem of God's emotions and then proceeds to discuss each one. The possible solutions are: (1) God has anger but no kindness; (2) God has neither anger nor kindness (Epicurus); (3) God has kindness but no anger (Stoic); (4) God has both anger and kindness. The Epicurean view is excluded on the grounds that if God feels nothing whatsoever, there is no concern for the world and no divine providence. If divine concern and providence disappear, so does divine reflection and perception, and therefore divine existence.
92
The third solution is rejected: if one emotion is felt by God, so must its opposite, since opposite emotions are caused by opposite external circum stances. 93 To be consistent with Himself, God must feel hatred for the wicked people just as He feels love for the good, "because the loving of the good arises from the hatred of the wicked, and the hating of the wicked has its rise from the love of the good." To love, one must also hate, since "there are those who ought to be loved and there are those who ought to be hated." Lactantius does not believe that a Christian should repress his negative feelings; they are appropriate to some life 88 situations. 94 Besides, the emotional life has a unity of its own, a commotio in us and in God which cannot be set aside.
95
The correct solution is to think of God as feeling anger as well as kindness. All of piety and religion depends upon this understanding.
96
Lactantius proceeds to explain why religion is necessary for man.
97
Religion "cannot be taken away without destroying our hold of wisdom, by which we are separated from the brutes, and of justice, by which the public life may be maintained...." If you remove God's kindness or anger or both, you take away religion. If you take away religion, you lose that which is uniquely human, and that which is necessary for the social order, especially the fear of the Lord's punishment.
98
In chapter 15 Lactantius makes a necessary distinction about God's emotions: there are those He feels and those He cannot feel. God cannot have fear, because He is "liable neither to want nor injury nor pain nor death ... ," which are the causes of fear. He can do whatever He wishes and therefore envies no one. 99 He has no sexual passion, because He has no need of a successor or consort. God is also free of avarice and grief.
Lactantius' treatise on divine anger makes it clear how important it was to him to have a theology of God which maintains His personality. Without divine personality and the emotions which accompany it, the Christian doctrine of providence is lost for Lactantius. The Christian understanding of providence and divine personhood cannot be rendered in a consistent and meaningfully religious way if one adheres strictly to the Middle Platonist or Epicurean conception of God's transcendent immutability. Lactantius saw this quite clearly, as did Tertullian.
CONCLUSION
The three types of divine mutability which Tertullian saw raise interesting possibilities for theology, despite his incapacity to systematically construct a consistent doctrine of God. He felt that God had to change in order to adopt a new attitude to a new situation, that is, to human sinfulness. God also had to feel appropriate emotions to be a judge as well as to love His people properly. Finally, as historical circumstances changed, so necessarily did God's will for us.
Novatian sees the necessity for God's emotions, especially for His wrath, but does less with this insight than Tertullian because he eventually takes refuge in God's incomprehensibility. To proceed in a positive, rational description of God, one must specify exactly where incomprehensibility lies, so that the theory itself guards against any premature appeal to it. Arnobius, of course, denies the possibility of divine emotions and mutability because of his concern to distinguish the Christian God from the many deities of Greece and Rome. He takes refuge, one might suggest, in Epicurus, thereby ruling out any rational understanding of God's mutability.
Lactantius, on the other hand, faces squarely the problem of divine emotions and mutability and is able to formulate his insight logically. In reaction to Arnobius, he argues that God must react to the world in a providential manner, and that this reaction must include emotions. Both he and Tertullian see clearly, however, that God must have emotions in some divine manner, either by feeling only the most appropriate emotions or by having all emotions perfectly.
One might fruitfully compare the discussions of divine mutability in these writers with those of Augustine, who sees no possibility whatever for including emotion and mutability in his description of God. One might suspect, if one read only Augustine, that the discussions we have outlined never occurred. In text after text Augustine consistently asserts divine immutability, thereby intensifying the classical theological problems of creation in time, divine influence and human freedom, predestination, and divine foreknowledge.
This study suggests that a contemporary theology which attempts realistically to uphold God's personhood, especially in regard to His emotions and His ability to change, does have the weight of some important theological tradition on its side, despite its divergence from Augustine and the mainstream of early theology in the East. Whatever direction one takes in constructing a contemporary doctrine of God, it is important to notice that the theological tradition, at least in this case, does present alternatives.
